

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of RICHARD BRUNSON, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

CRYSTAL BRUNSON,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
February 21, 2006

No. 264274
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-000198-NA

Before: Cooper, P.J., and Jansen and Markey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her son pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

We review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). A finding is clearly erroneous when we are left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. *In re JK*, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong. *Sours, supra*. If the trial court determines that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for termination, the court must terminate parental rights unless it finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review the trial court's decision regarding the child's best interests for clear error. *Id.* at 356-357.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for the termination of respondent's parental rights. Petitioner sought termination of respondent's parental rights primarily based on respondent's lack of stable housing and legal employment. The evidence presented at the termination hearings more than one year later established that respondent continued to lack stable housing and had not obtained employment despite numerous services provided by petitioner. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted because the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and because respondent failed to provide proper care or custody and could not

be expected to do so within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Respondent argues that termination was improper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) because no evidence was presented that Richard would be harmed if returned to respondent's care. However, because the trial court properly found clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), we need not address the other grounds for termination. One ground alone is sufficient. *Trejo, supra* at 360.

Respondent does not argue that termination of her parental rights was clearly contrary to the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).

We affirm.

/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey